The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was introduced in 2018 to harmonize data privacy and security laws across the European Union (EU). It applies to any organization collecting personal data in the EU. To date, service-level consent has been used as a proportionate approach for clinical trials, which implement low-risk, routine, service-wide interventions for which individual consent is considered inappropriate. In the context of public health research, GDPR now requires that individuals have the option to choose whether their data may (...) be used for research, which presents a challenge when consent has been given by the clinical service and not by individual service users. We report here on development of a pragmatic opt-out solution to this consent paradox in the context of a partner notification intervention trial in sexual health clinics in the UK. Our approach supports the individual’s right to withhold their data from trial analysis while routinely offering the same care to all patients. (shrink)

This essay develops a theory of identities, selves, and ‘the self’ that both explains the sense in which selves are narratively constituted and also explains how the self relates to a person's individual autobiographical identity and to their various social identities. I argue that identities are the contents of narratively structured representations, some of which are hosted individually and are autobiographical in form, and others of which are hosted collectively and are biographical in form. These identities, in turn, give rise (...) to selves of various sorts—true selves, autobiographical selves, public and private selves, merely possible selves, and so on—which are the characters (or presupposed subjects) that appear in our various identities. Although the theory I develop bears some obvious affinities with the view that selves are fictional characters, the two views are in fact distinct, for reasons explained at the end. (shrink)

This is a competent and sympathetic introduction to the life and thought of Leibniz. It reads, on the surface, like an encyclopedia article or a chapter in a critical history of philosophy. But there is a meta-critical strain governing the exposition. Within a limited space, Van Peursen has molded a presentation which manages to balance considerations of what was central to Leibniz' philosophy from Leibniz' point of view with issues which have special relevance for contemporary philosophy. For example, Van Peursen (...) devotes his longest chapter, "The Logic of an Optimal World: Truth, Freedom, God," to the teleological and ethical roots of Leibniz' ontology. Leibniz preferred to stress the nature/grace and best-of-all-possible-worlds aspects of this teleological ontology. But contemporary philosophy has difficulty relating to this way of expressing the Platonic notion of the primacy of the good over the true. So Van Peursen, while not neglecting Leibniz' focus, also draws attention to a modern reworking of this point: the idea, familiar to contemporary semiotic, that syntactics must ultimately be grounded in pragmatics. Beginning students will find this introduction readable and genuinely helpful. Teachers of philosophy will benefit from the author's historical acuity as well as the clarity of exposition. An index and a brief bibliography are included.--E. A. R. (shrink)

Adherence to a few basic principles of textbook reading compilation have made this one of the more worthwhile introductory philosophy texts. In the first place, the editors have given lengthy and frequently complete texts. Anselm's Proslogium, Descartes' Meditations, Plato's Phaedo, and Kant's Prolegomena are given complete or nearly complete; there is a ninety-one page extract from Locke's Essay, over fifty pages of James and nearly forty pages from Whitehead. This still leaves room for ample primary material by Leibniz, Hume, and (...) Schopenhauer. The plan of the book is to frame the important primary text with intellectually contemporaneous discussion of the problems treated in the primary text, and then to bracket each section with a prologue and epilogue drawn—except in the final section where Plato has the last word—from twentieth-century literature relevant to the issues under discussion in each section. The authors are thus able to provide an historical and thematic introduction to philosophy, which together cannot help but impress the beginning student with the unity of philosophical experience. Obviously no single textbook will ever escape the need for supplementation; this one in particular will require those who would like their students to be exposed to more phenomenology and existentialism, and, to a lesser degree, analytical philosophy, to introduce additional reading. But Epstein and Kennedy have provided the basic skeleton to which may be added as much flesh as the instructor desires.—E. A. R. (shrink)

This is an excellent addition to Bobbs-Merrill's "Text and Commentary Series." In addition to the text of the Principles, there are eleven critical essays, three of which are original with this volume. Turbayne has arranged the essays to parallel the unfolding of the major themes in the Principles. Thus, he himself opens with "Berkeley's Metaphysical Grammar," which picks up and develops the theme of the centrality of the study of language to the philosophical enterprise, a point Berkeley makes in his (...) "Preface." Next, W. H. Hay and Richard Van Iten are paired together with different perspectives on Berkeley's nominalism. By way of comment on esse is percipi, G. E. Moore and W. T. Stace present their respective refutations of idealism and realism. Richard Popkin discusses skepticism and Berkeley. Popper examines the ways in which Berkeley anticipated Mach and Einstein, as well as significant features of contemporary philosophy of science. Turbayne and Cornman offer differing appraisals of the philosophy of mind that is sketched in the Principles. Paul Olscamp attempts to systematize the elements of Berkeley's critical theory. Finally, J. D. Mabbott treats of "The Place of God in Berkeley's Philosophy" and argues for a radical voluntarism in Berkeley--a not surprising analysis, but one which often gets buried under the epistemological issues raised in the Principles. Turbayne has also supplied an excellent introduction, a chronology of Berkeley's life, a working bibliography, and an analytical index. This enhances the usefulness of an already first-rate book.--E. A. R. (shrink)

The joy at seeing another of Thomas' historically and doctrinally important Commentaries on Aristotle translated into English is somewhat dampened by the prodigality of this edition. The translator's introduction is printed in both volumes, and, in a way which suggests that some mystical significance was attached to reaching 1,000 pages, 56 identical pages of bibliography and index are printed in each volume. Litzinger has included his translation of what he takes to be William of Moerbeke's Latin translation of Aristotle's Ethics, (...) and supposedly the text from which Aquinas worked. The translator has gone to a great deal of trouble in providing treatise, book, and lesson outlines, based on Thomas' own analytical outline, and lettered in such a way that the reader can always locate in an instant the point in Aristotle's text to which Thomas is referring—E. A. R. (shrink)

"From beginning to end, art is bent upon making; this book says nothing else." Fortunately, we need not take the author at his word. But if the reader sees this, maintains Gilson, he will see the errors in those philosophical approaches to art which mistake esthetics for the philosophy of art, and mistake what is a mode of being simply as production with what is a mode of being as knowledge. The foe is "noematism" and Gilson is tireless in exposing (...) its occurrence in all philosophical views of art since Plato—even in Aristotle, for whom he, otherwise, has a decided preference. Only with Nietzsche does art assert its independence of anthrôpos théôrétikos and ally itself with the Will to Power. Gilson does not approve of this extreme but he does recognize it as the inevitable result of trying to cast art in the role of the messenger of meaning, be that meaning the highest, as with the intuitionism of the Romantics, or the lowest, as in the "imitation of an imitation" notion propounded by Plato. Not that there is no meaning to be had from works of art; but concentration on the contemplation of a work of art—the province of esthetics—distracts from the recognition of the purpose of art itself, namely the activity of subordinating matter to form in the well-making of a sensible product whose being is "conceived in beauty." This latter is the proper function of the philosophy of art.—E. A. R. (shrink)

As is pointed out in an excellent introduction, this translation of Peter of Spain's work on syncategorematic terms and the accompanying treatises on Obligations, Insoluables, and Consequences provide important additions to a steadily increasing body of sources upon which an as-yet-unwritten adequate history of medieval logic will be based. As an interesting and helpful guide, the introduction provides modern symbolic translations of the logical rules verbally formulated by the original authors.—E. A. R.

Eleven previously published essays presenting a moderately unified argument in favor of the general conception of what Jonas calls the "Philosophy of Life," as well as detailed arguments pointing in the direction of a non-dualistic, realistic, and non-naturalistic philosophy of mind. The "nons" are deliberately placed, as Jonas spends the better part of the book questioning the tenability of dualistic and, especially, materialistic and mechanistically oriented theories of mind. With extraordinary historical sensitivity—at times threatening to dissolve a problem by laying (...) bare the conceptual confusions which surrounded its origins—and with a better than working knowledge of biology and physiology, not to mention anthropology, Jonas argues, on the one hand, that the clues to the dynamism and structure of mind are to be found in such organic features as sentience, motility, and emotion: e.g., the conceptual strands that unite in the notions of causality and truth are rooted in the respective experiences of force and resistance, and vision. On the other hand, Jonas argues for the irreducibility of the subject-object structure of man's relation to nature on the grounds that this is the necessary burden of subjectivity. In all, the book is an impressive performance.—E. A. R. (shrink)

The volume opens with selections from Descartes and proceeds in chronological order through the contributions of forty other authors to the philosophy of mind, ending with J. Shaffer's "Could mental states be brain processes?" Other recent contributors include Ryle, Vesey, Smart, Strawson, Wisdom, Campbell, and MacKay. For the combination of the period and perspectives covered, the book is as exhaustive as could be hoped. Vesey's analytical index makes the volume an even more valuable tool for the beginning student.—E. A. R.

Like its predecessors in this new sixty volume edition of the Summa, this book has been meticulously prepared. A working text has been taken from the Parma text with corrections added from the Leonine version, and Gilby provides his usual sound but readable translation. The specific questions treated are "Moral Good and Evil in Human Acts in General," "Moral Good and Evil in the Will's Inner Activity," "Moral Good and Evil in Outward Acts," and "Corollaries to Moral Good and Evil (...) in Human Acts." Gilby's appendices give a compendious treatment to St. Thomas' entire moral philosophy, locating it systematically within the successively broadening contexts of moral theology and sacra doctrina generally and substantively in the dual contexts of St. Thomas' biologically based anthropology and metaphysically founded natural theology—E. A. R. (shrink)

This is number 18 in Herder's Quaestiones Disputatae series. It is made up of four chapters from Rahner's Schriften zur Theologie, VI. The first and fourth essays, "The Changing Church" and "The Teaching of Vatican II on the Church and the Future Reality of Christian Life," complement one another, in a rough sort of way, in their treatment of the issue of continuity and change within the Church. The former tackles the problem from the limited point of view of the (...) authoritative and magisterial church. The latter has the more plenary notion of the Church as the solidarity of the faithful and consequently offers a more satisfying treatment of the theme. The second essay covers the topic "Situation Ethics in Ecumenical Perspective" in a non-surprising but quite elegant fashion. Rahner's characteristic sense of proportion is most evident in the essay "The Church's Limits Against Clerical Triumphalists and Lay Defeatists." He resists the all-or-nothing logic which says the Church must completely overlap and transform--at least in intention--the secular domain or be condemned to impotence and irrelevance. The true role of the Church, for Rahner, is found rather in witness: the Church as the sign of the salvation of the world.--E. A. R. (shrink)

Kemp Smith was preeminently a philosopher of philosophers, which is something a bit more than an historian of philosophy. Representing this side of his work in this volume we have "The Naturalism of Hume, I and II," "Avenarius' Philosophy of Pure Experience, I and II," "Whitehead's Philosophy of Nature," "John Locke," and "Bergson's Manner of Approach to Moral and Social Questions." At other times Kemp Smith could turn his attention to "The Nature of Universals, I, II, and III," "Immortality," "The (...) Moral Sanction of Force," and the question from which the volume takes its title, "Is Divine Existence Credible?" The editors inform us that Kemp Smith took this latter question to be the central problem of philosophy. In addition to the papers mentioned, there are five other essays by Kemp Smith and a sizeable introduction by the editors: Porteous provides a biographical sketch of Kemp Smith, Maclennan a consideration of the centrality of the question of Divine existence, and Davie an account of what he takes to be the significance of Kemp Smith's philosophical papers.—E. A. R. (shrink)

Over six hundred entries, each bearing the stamp, in an immensely concise fashion, of that unique synthesis of traditional and contemporary categories of theological understanding that one has learned to associate, particularly, with the name of Rahner. For the beginning student of Catholic theology, this book is a must; nor will the advanced readily exhaust its store of theological perceptiveness.—E. A. R.

In addition to an exceptional readability, these systematic reflections on the logical and explanatory nature of natural science have as their chief merit the well-executed resolve of their author to locate science as a logically structured and confirmed body of knowledge within the broader context of science as a human activity, involving indispensible personal and intersubjective dimensions. Nash combines this sensitivity with an impressive grasp of the history of modern science, and the book as a whole is sprinkled with uniformly (...) apropos quotations from scientists and philosophers of science. Unfortunately, however, natural science becomes uncritically identified with science as such, i.e., our total systematic, rational picture of the world; and Nash has not marshalled anything near the epistemological resources required to support his version of scientific realism. Consequently, the book provides little for the philosopher of science to get excited about, though it might be useful for cross-disciplinary purposes and would provide a good introduction for the educated layman.—E. A. R. (shrink)

The volume includes representative and self-contained selections from fifteen authors covering various aspects of the problem of free will. Included are readings from Jonathan Edwards, Calvin, Schlick, Peirce, James, Mill, F. S. C. Schiller, Hospers, Swedenborg, Hume, Stace, Bertocci, Ledger Wood, and Douglas Browning. Enteman has added an elementary introduction and an appendix on "Microphysics and Free Will." Noticeably absent are selections from existential and phenomenological sources. There is a good bibliography, one which makes the reader envious that it was (...) not invaded more extensively for the purposes of the present volume.—E. A. R. (shrink)

The author finds the modern problem of God to be centered in man's loss of the sense of God. God is rejected because he sustains or permits, and is in that measure ineffective in the face of, evil. But the various forms of humanism, scientific or atheistic, that man has substituted in his independent attempt to eradicate evil fall short—and even stand in danger of individual and social perversion—because they fail to meet the challenge of man's person for which sin (...) is a psychological as well as a theological reality. In emphasizing the need to re-establish reason's right to investigate and pronounce on the existence of God, the author evaluates and criticizes Existentialism and the "way of the heart" approaches of Pascal and Newman, and approvingly expounds Maréchal's approach to the existence of God through the finality expressed in man's dynamic, unrestricted desire to know, an attempt to do justice to both the ontological tradition and the Kantian critique.—E. A. R. (shrink)

In general, the eleven, previously unpublished papers are not as strong as those in the first series. Bromberger attempts to detail the necessary and sufficient conditions for something's being an explanation; Anscombe offers some provocative but inconclusive remarks on the intentionality of sensation; Malpas examines some criteriological puzzles which arise in considering the location of sound as a bit of unlearned perceptual behavior. The rest of the papers are second order assessments and attacks upon positions maintained by other analytical philosophers. (...) Of these Putnam's attack on Malcolm's brand of behaviorism and Butler's attempted dissolution of Goodman's "grue" paradox make their points most effectively. Moravcsik contends, against Strawson, that events are at least as primitive in our conceptual scheme as physical bodies. Wiggins questions some Fregean analyses of the logic of identity-statements; taking off from Strawson, Woods distinguishes a principle of individuation from a criterion of identity and attempts to clarify their separate but related roles by an analysis of the sorts of questions that require their use in giving answers. Rundle is concerned to modify certain Quinean answers to paradoxes of tense requirements that arise in the quantification of modal statements; Savan questions Vlastos' ascription of fallacies to the Socratic argument on the unity of Wisdom and Temperance in the Protagoras. Finally, Shorter points out the general inconclusiveness of "transformational analysis" by exhibiting specific shortcomings of Vendler's analysis of causality in the first volume of this series.—E. A. R. (shrink)

A very readable and for the most part nontechnical explanation of the logic, structure, and operation of computers. Fink sketches approaches to the questions of computer-brain analogies, computer creativity, and artificial intelligence but these are not his main concern. The book is designed for those who have more than a casual interest but less than a professional competence, and is successful within these limits.—E. A. R.

This paperback edition of Dodds's standard edition of Plato's Gorgias is designed to meet the needs both of undergraduates and professional scholars. The text and apparatus criticus are based on a fresh survey of the evidence: two major manuscripts are here for the first time fully collated, and account has been taken both of new papyri and of the exceptionally rich indirect tradition. The text is supplemented by a full introduction giving details on the subject and structure of the dialogue, (...) its characters and intended historical setting, the real date of composition, and the background to Plato and Athens at the time of composition. The commentary, besides explaining Platonic usages and discussing textual points, aims to treat the historical, philosphical, and literary questions which arise from the text. (shrink)

Twenty essays by fifteen British and American writers representing some of the best anglo-american Platonic scholarship dating, chiefly, from the fifties but with essays by Cherniss, Ryle, Vlastos, and Hackforth dating from the thirties. The later dialogues are the focus with nine of the essays treating the Theory of Forms explicitly. Included are essays by Ryle and Runciman on the Parmenides, and also the Vlastos-Geach exchange on the Third Man Argument. The Timaeus is covered by Cherniss' "On the Relation of (...) the Timaeus to Plato's Later Dialogues," and also by Vlastos' "The Disorderly Motion in the Timaeus" and Morrow's "Necessity and Persuasion in Plato's Timaeus." In all, a welcome collection.—E. A. R. (shrink)

Al Kindi was, according to Rescher, one of the first of the Medieval Arabian philosophers who took science rather than theology as the locus for his philosophical efforts. Rescher's well-ordered bibliography is meant to provide the most essential part of the research apparatus for the as-yet-unwritten comprehensive study of Al-Kindi and the place of his work in the history of philosophy.—E. A. R.

Embodiment, Vesey maintains, is the term applied to our experience of an unmediated movement of our body and an unmediated awareness within perceptual experience. Vesey argues for embodiment as the most satisfying explanation of the mind-body relationship chiefly by arguing against substance dualism as presented by the Local Sign theory of sensation and the Ideo-motor theory of bodily movement. The former is deficient because it rests on the false empirical assumption that all perceptual capacities are learned; the latter is inadequate (...) for more complex reasons, the development of which leads Vesey through his own theory of perception and movement. Vesey's own theory rests on contrast between causal, substance dualism and his own favored, non-causal, subject-object duality, which avoids an absolute dualism because of the internal relatedness of its key terms from the outset. The first half of the book presents a concise review and criticism of current non-dualistic views of the mind-body relation other than that of embodiment; here Vesey has a brief and somewhat unsatisfying skirmish with double aspect and identity theories.—E. A. R. (shrink)

Background: Patient autonomy has been promoted as the most important principle to guide difficult clinical decisions. To examine whether practising physicians indeed value patient autonomy above other considerations, physicians were asked to weight patient autonomy against three other criteria that often influence doctors’ decisions. Associations between physicians’ religious characteristics and their weighting of the criteria were also examined. Methods: Mailed survey in 2007 of a stratified random sample of 1000 US primary care physicians, selected from the American Medical Association masterfile. (...) Physicians were asked how much weight should be given to the following: (1) the patient’s expressed wishes and values, (2) the physician’s own judgment about what is in the patient’s best interest, (3) standards and recommendations from professional medical bodies and (4) moral guidelines from religious traditions. Results: Response rate 51% (446/879). Half of physicians (55%) gave the patient’s expressed wishes and values “the highest possible weight”. In comparative analysis, 40% gave patient wishes more weight than the other three factors, and 13% ranked patient wishes behind some other factor. Religious doctors tended to give less weight to the patient’s expressed wishes. For example, 47% of doctors with high intrinsic religious motivation gave patient wishes the “highest possible weight”, versus 67% of those with low (OR 0.5; 95% CI 0.3 to 0.8). Conclusions: Doctors believe patient wishes and values are important, but other considerations are often equally or more important. This suggests that patient autonomy does not guide physicians’ decisions as much as is often recommended in the ethics literature. (shrink)

Experimental psychologists in the learning tradition stress the importance of three of the authors' four key variables of experimental design. We review research investigating the roles played by these variables in studies of choice from our laboratory. Supporting the authors' claims, these studies show that the effects of these variables are not fixed and should not be taken for granted.

Another title in the Modern Studies in Philosophy published by Doubleday under the general editorship of Amélie O. Rorty. Thirteen essays plus part of J. L. Ackrill's translation of the Categories are included. The view is mainly from Oxford and is, in the words of the editor, "piecemeal" and "pluralistic." What this means is that there are three essays on Aristotle's logic, two on his categories, four on his metaphysics, and four on his ethics. Nothing on Aristotle's psychology is included. (...) This, however, is due more to the fact that little has been written on this Aristotelian topic in Anglo-American circles than to editorial oversight. The essays by Woods, Moravcsik, and Urmson were written especially for this volume and the Austin article also appears for the first time. A short bibliography is appended.--E. A. R. (shrink)

In the Preface, Kargon states the two objectives of this monograph in the history of science: "First, I wish to bring to the attention of historians of science the existence and importance of two circles of natural philosophers which played an important role in the history of atomism. Secondly, I wish to trace the evolution of atomism and illustrate the mechanism of its establishment in England in the latter seventeenth century. In doing so, I will re-evaluate the contributions of four (...) major figures and many minor ones, including Walter Charleton, the Duke and Duchess of Newcastle, William Petty, Charles Cavendish, and John Pell". Kargon turns in cash on both promissory notes with a careful yet highly readable piece of scholarship. Some obscurities remain, however, in particular his attempt to link the Northumberland and Newcastle groups with the suggestion that Hobbes' atomism might have been influenced through his connection with John Pell. Concurrence rather than influence was more likely the case. It is also suggested that there might have been a link between Bacon's early atomism and that of Hariot's Northumberland group. But once again the arguments in favor of such a connection are inconclusive at best. Of great importance for the history of atomism is the influence maintained to have been exerted by the 1653 publication of Bacon's atomistic works; this influence was felt by the Newcastle group and the Royal Society. Most interesting, however, is the securely attested influence of the Baconian method on Barrow, Newton, and the Royal Society in general.—E. A. R. (shrink)

In this 1965 Lindley Lecture Hampshire centers his argument around the nature of belief; but the argument could be easily generalized to cover any mental act or activity where reasons rather than causes are invoked to classify and partially explain the act or activity in question. The causes which Hampshire distinguishes from reasons are the sort that would fit into explanations of the covering-law variety. Hampshire argues that causes in the above mentioned sense undoubtedly form the basis for intentional activity; (...) but were an agent to be shown that such causes were the sufficient conditions for a particular piece of his behavior, he would change the classification of this particular bit of behavior from intentional to non-intentional. The effect would not, however, be a reductive explanation of intentional behavior, but merely a limitation of its scope. The point is seen most clearly in the case of belief: if it appeared that there were sufficient causal conditions for a given belief, the holder of this belief would reassess his position and transform his belief into an inclination to belief. The causal conditions would become part of the evidential basis for re-making or rejecting the belief. The point is that belief itself requires a commitment beyond the given; and the ontological requirement of such a commitment is what Hampshire, following Spinoza, calls "freedom of mind."--E. A. R. (shrink)

There are sound scholarly reasons for regarding anything published about or written by Teilhard de Chardin as "hot copy," but in the case of the present volume of letters it appears to be cult interests that are being exploited rather than scholarly interests that are being served. In the first place this translation includes only the second half of the French original, Lettres d'Hastings et de Paris. The French text included all of Teilhard's letters to his parents from 1908 through (...) his induction into the French Army in 1914, not simply the letters between 1912-after Teilhard returned to Paris from his scholasticate at Ore Place to resume his studies in biology and paleontology—and 1914. The publisher has inexcusably failed to note this fact in the proper place, viz., in de Lubac's introduction which was written for all of the letters, not simply for those from 1912 on. In the second place, it is simply not true to say, as the dust cover does, that these letters "provide another and indispensible key to the genesis of his [Teilhard's] thought." These letters bear witness to Teilhard's filial piety and provide, at best, obscure and oblique references to his intellectual growth. The letters are not valueless, but this English edition has been handled irresponsibly from the point of view of amount of material included, emphasis indicated, and price asked.—E. A. R. (shrink)

Reck has rendered the philosophical community an invaluable service in providing these lucid, systematic and faithful expositions of the thought of the ten men he has selected: R. B. Perry, W. E. Hocking, G. H. Mead, J. E. Boodin, W. M. Urban, D. H. Parker, R. W. Sellars, A. O. Lovejoy, E. Jordan and E. S. Brightman. Included is a general introduction in which Reck offers a brief perspective upon the extra ordinary diversity and richness characteristic of the period in (...) American philosophy which these men represent. Bibliographical notes are given at the end of each chapter.—E. A. R. (shrink)

In this Swarthmore Lecture for 1965 a noted philosopher engages in a disciplined philosophical attempt 1) to locate the essence of religion as the ultimate integrating principle among "persons in relation," and 2) to show how religion has been beset by a constant temptation throughout its history to assume dualistic attitudes and practices. Such attitudes and practices invariably lead to an idealism which denies rather than faces the real conflict in the world, the conflict that it is the task of (...) the progressively realized Christian community to overcome. The autobiographical material which Macmurray includes is enough in itself to establish the value of this book; his reflections on the nature, present condition, and future task of Christianity are so much more frosting added to the cake—E. A. R. (shrink)

Along with other complete selections this volume contains the complete text of the Praise of Folly, The Handbook of the Militant Christian, and The Complaint of Peace. Dolan's translation achieves a freshness that recaptures the spirit that Erasmus' original texts must have had when he first published them. The commentary by Dolan is sympathetic and scholarly. This is by far the best inexpensive introduction to the thought of Erasmus.—E. A. R.

These Terry Lectures for 1962 develop Polanyi's notion of tacit knowing through three stages: its epistemological analysis and justification, its ontological generalization to a doctrine of emergence, and its social dimension and implications. and may be briefly characterized as follows: Tacit knowledge refers to the set of particulars implicitly grasped in the explicit grasping of a comprehensive entity, the latter being the meaning of the former. Mutually supporting doctrines of epistemological isomorphism and critical realism underlie the argument, but the crucial, (...) unjustified assumption is that tacit "knowing" is a knowing. Why not assimilate it to patterned-governed behavior explicable on an S-R model? Ontologically, the tacit component shows up as the set of particulars with their attendant structural laws which underlie but do not exhaustively define the comprehensive entities of which, due to the mechanism of emergence, they are components. Non-reducibility is evidenced by the dynamic or operational laws which govern the emergent entities, but which do not show up in the lower level account. The qualitative irreducibility of sentience is mentioned but not developed as an argument. In justifying his notion of a mechanism of emergence, Polanyi at first makes some rather obscure references to vitalism, an organismic principle, and élan vital, but then comes out with a more properly metaphysical analysis in terms of the eliciting function of a principle of potentiality. There is a definite Whiteheadian ring to the analysis, but Whitehead is nowhere mentioned. Polanyi's work deserves serious attention, and this compact presentation of some of the essentials of his thought will serve to send more readers on to, or back to, Personal Knowledge.—E. A. R. (shrink)

Sixteen articles by fifteen authors, two of which, the ones by Plantinga and Kenny, have never appeared in this form before. Three of the selections have been translated for the first time from French: those by B. A. O. Williams, E. Bréhier, and P. H. J. Hoenen. The latter two selections are the sole representatives of French Cartesian scholarship. This is unfortunate, as Descartes' positive contribution to modern philosophy is better reflected in recent phenomenological and existential philosophy. The dominant tone (...) of this volume is negative and piecemeal, though in terms of this limited approach to Cartesian studies there are many excellent essays in this volume. The balance of the contributors includes Ayer, Moore, Ryle, A. K. Stout, Malcolm, Hintikka, Gewirth, Prichard, Frankfurt, and Alston. The editor has included a very comprehensive bibliography.—E. A. R. (shrink)

It is a pleasure to see that there is an art to editing college, readings texts. Individual editors handle five more or less isolable schools of thought, and in the same stroke achieve a modest effort in the history of ethical thought. I. The "Classical" authors include Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas ; II. "Dialectical" thinkers include Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Marx, Engels ; III. "American Naturalistic Thought" contains selections from James, Dewey, Edel, Hook, Romanell, Dennes ; IV. "Analytic" selections are from Moore, (...) Schlick, Ayer, Stevenson, Toulmin, Nowell-Smith ; V. "Existentialist" material is from Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Sartre, Marcel, Camus, Teilhard de Chardin. The introductions to each section are well-done and genuinely informative, and include a glossary of key terms occurring throughout each particular section. Analytically designed questions are placed after each selection and each section contains a selected but annotated bibliography.—E. A. R. (shrink)

We examine “de Broglie-Bohm” causal trajectories for the two electrons in a nonrelativistic helium atom, taking into account the spin-dependent momentum terms that arise from the Pauli current. Given that this many-body problem is not exactly solvable, we examine approximations to various helium eigenstates provided by a low-dimensional basis comprised of tensor products of one-particle hydrogenic eigenstates.First to be considered are the simplest approximations to the ground and first-excited electronic states found in every introductory quantum mechanics textbook. For example, the (...) trajectories associated with the simple 1s(1)1s(2) approximation to the ground state are, to say the least, nontrivial and nonclassical.We then examine higher-dimensional approximations, i.e., eigenstates Ψ α of the Hamiltonian in this truncated basis, and show that ∇ i S α =0 for both particles, implying that only the spin-dependent momentum term contributes to electronic motion. This result is independent of the size of the truncated basis set, implying that the qualitative features of the trajectories will be the same, regardless of the accuracy of the eigenfunction approximation.The electronic motion associated with these eigenstates is quite specialized due to the condition that the spins of the two electrons comprise a two-spin eigenfunction of the total spin operator. The electrons either (i) remain stationary or (ii) execute circular orbits around the z-axis with constant velocity. (shrink)